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Delivering a systems engineering and safety assurance (SESA) service that adds real value to projects and provides value for money to clients

Profile

UK based SESA, RAMS, RCM, RDT and EMC specialists
National and international client base
Engineered solutions for RCM and RDT programmes (RaCom)
Sectors
  • Rail and metro systems
  • Process and power generation
  • Aerospace and defence
Responsive, agile and effective
  • Understanding and meeting client needs
  • Exceeding client expectations
  • Fully flexible and fully accountable
  • Instilling clarity and objectivity to intractable problems
  • Ability to reconcile complex problems into logical elements

Services

Safety and Risk Management
  • Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)
  • Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) & Fault Tree Analysis (FTA);
  • HazID/HazOP
  • Preparation of comprehensive, clear and concise technical documentation
  • Fully conversant with CENELEC, CSM and CMREA
Reliability Assessment and Growth
  • Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) analysis
  • Reliability Demonstration Testing (RDT) using RaCom RDT module
  • FRACAS/DRACAS
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)
  • SAE JA1012 compliant tools and processes using RaCom RCM module
Independent Safety Assessment (ISA)
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
  • System assessment and modelling
  • Fully conversant with EN50121 and IEC 61000 series standards

Technologies

The questions
  • Is the reliability of key assets essential for safety and/or operations?
  • Do these assets have a maintenance burden?
  • Can knowledge of in-service reliability performance aid operational & maintenance strategies?
The answer
RCM and RDT FRACAS in one integrated software tool
The benefits
  • Provides the measures and metrics to optimise maintenance schedules and reduce whole-life costs of assets
  • Enables in-service evaluation of reliability performance
  • Shows reliability growth of mission critical systems

Training

Transsol offers a range of courses designed to provide:

  • An introduction to the concepts of probability theory and numerical analysis
  • The use of software tools for fault tree and reliability block diagram analyses
  • Reliability centred maintenance - process, tools and application of SAE JA1012
  • Reliability demonstration testing - process, tools and application of RaCom RDT module
  • Safety assessment techniques and application of CENELEC standards
  • Determination of Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)

The courses assume no prior knowledge of the basic concepts nor the use of specific software tools. To this end they cater for those that are new to this field of engineering but are of sufficient depth to be useful to those with prior knowledge who wish to improve their understanding and skill set.

Starting with the basics we build on these and learn how to apply reliability and safety engineering techniques to systems’ engineering problems. The objective is to provide the insights necessary to establish adequate measures of safety and reliability and for maintenance planning/forecasting.

Throughout the courses real world problems are used to illustrate the methodologies.

Whilst no prior knowledge of the specific technical areas of safety/reliability engineering is required it is beneficial for attendees to be qualified engineers with a grasp of the issues that need to be dealt with for the design, installation, maintenance and operation of modern systems and equipment.

Quality


Quality in everything we do and everything we deliver

Full UKAS/IAS accredited ISO 9001:2015 Quality Management System

  • QMS implemented across the business
  • Controls all aspects of what we do
  • Programme of continuous improvement of skills and competencies
  • Adherence to a documented code of ethics
  • Procedures in place for independent dispute resolution

Projects

Safety Assurance and RAM



Transsol has secured two contracts from Metrolinx, the Crown agency of the Government of Ontario that manages and integrates road, rail and other public transport on the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA).


Provision of Asset Class RAM Requirements and Validation Evidence


Required the derivation and specification of general and asset class specific RAM requirements and associated validation evidence together with definition of a project lifecycle phase when these are required (based on the CENELEC ‘V’ lifecycle) so that they can be used in the specification for new equipment on future projects.


Systems Engineering and Safety Assurance Framework Contract


The Canadian Railway Safety Management Regulations 2015, published by the Canadian Minister of Justice, establish the minimum requirements with respect to the safety management system that a company must develop and implement for the purpose of achieving the highest level of safety in its railway operations.


These are divided into three parts as follows:


Part 1 - Sets out requirements applicable to a railway company


Part 2 - Sets out requirements applicable to a local railway company divided as companies operating on main lines and those operating on non-main lines


Part 3 - Details consequential amendments


The regulations require the railway company to develop the following processes and procedures as part of its safety management systems:


  • Safety plans and methods
  • Accountability
  • Safety policy
  • Compliance with regulations and other instruments
  • Managing railway occurrences
  • Identifying safety concerns
  • Risk assessment
  • Implementing and evaluating remedial actions
  • Establishing targets and developing initiatives
  • Reporting contraventions and safety hazards
  • Managing knowledge
  • Scheduling
  • Continuous improvement of the safety management system

The services entail providing Metrolinx with specialised expert technical guidance in defining and drafting their Regulatory framework to comply with the Canadian Railway Safety Management Regulations using relevant standards (e.g. CENELEC and CMREA).

This includes:


  • Review of organisational policy, framework, standards and procedures
  • Review of methods used to specify and demonstrate RAMS of a rail system
  • Correctness and completeness of the hazard identification together with management and traceability to associated safety analyses
  • Adequacy of implementation of control measures
  • Demonstration of compliance with policy, standards and procedures

The services require proactive engagement with all stakeholders and reporting, together with provision of training aimed at development and delivery of content for knowledge transfer and provision of education and understanding of safety and systems assurance.



London Crossrail Project



Transsol’s involvement with the London Crossrail (Elizabeth Line) project spanned 12 years from 2010 to 2022 covering a number of separate projects with both the main delivery partner (Crossrail Ltd) and Tier 1 contractors (BBMV and BBMS).

Specifically this incorporated the following:



Engineering Safety Management



Engineering safety management for the design of the Canary Wharf and Woolwich stations. Transsol was responsible for the management of the Framework Design Consultant (FDC) for the contract C158 for the Woolwich station through the entire Crossrail Gate assurance process culminating in Gate 3 pass for the civil and structural works and Gate 2 for the MEP and architecture.

Prepared the Works Information for the subsequent tender process for the Woolwich station construction and fit-out works (contract C530).

The Canary Wharf station design and build contract was undertaken by Canary Wharf Group and this was outside of the formal Crossrail assurance process. Transsol was tasked with ensuring the that design did indeed comply with the Crossrail assurance processes by way of equivalence and supporting the same through the Crossrail Safety Review Group (SRG).

Crossrail Reliability Growth Programme



Appointed as the technical lead for the reliability growth programme for the Elizabeth Line covering rolling stock, signalling and train control, linewide systems (including traction power, tunnel ventilation and SCADA/communications equipment) and stations, shafts and portals. This was a critical task to support the Elizabeth Line Board in their decision-making processes for entry into trial running, trail operations and revenue services.



Whitechapel Station (C512) and Pudding Mill Lane Portal (C350) RAM



As part of the construction of the London Elizabeth Line (Crossrail) a joint venture of Balfour Beatty, Morgan Sindall and Vinci Construction (BBMV) were awarded the contract for the construction of the new Whitechapel station (C512). This was to provide a new interchange station for the Elizabeth Line integrated with the existing underground and overground stations operated by Transport for London (TfL). The BBMV scope of works included design and construction of the new station and ventilation shafts to the east and west ends.

Joint venture Balfour Beatty Morgan Sindall (BBMS) was awarded the contract construction and fit-out of the Pudding Mill Lave portal (C350).

As part of both the BBMV and BBMS scope of works there was a requirement to comply with the Crossrail Works’ Information Volume 2B Part 30 (RAM) which defined the high-level RAM requirements for the MEP systems and equipment to be installed. Transsol was awarded the contract to undertake all RAM activities and prepare all RAM deliverables in accordance with the requirements of the Volume 2B Part 30 document.

The works covered the full RAM lifecycle from RAM planning, through RAM predictions and analysis to RAM demonstration and handover covering:

  • RAM organisation
  • Management of RAM related interfaces with other stakeholders
  • Provisions and procedures for interfacing with other disciplines in the BBMV and BBMS overall organisation
  • Identifying and deriving RAM requirements
  • Formulating RAM methodologies and tools
  • Management of sub-contractors’ RAM activities
  • V&V of RAM data
  • Validation of RAM requirements during procurement/manufacture, installation, commissioning and operation/maintenance
  • Undertaking RAM assessments and preparing RAM deliverables


Once installed, all systems were subject to a formal RAM demonstration programme to accord with the evolving Employer’s requirements regarding RAM demonstration. To this end a RAM demonstration plan was prepared that set out how the evidence to demonstrate that the procured equipment met the defined or derived RAM requirements would be obtained and reported.

  • Reliability information for the procured equipment with a corresponding update of the design stage RAM assessments
  • Collation of fault data up to and during trial operations to:
    • Demonstrate that there are no systematic failures due to design errors
    • Demonstrate that the systems and equipment were reliability mature
  • Demonstration of reliability growth through cumulated reliability performance


Doha Metro Gold Line Project



The Doha Metro Gold Line is a new underground metro line running from Ras Bu Abboud station (incorporating switch box and stabling yard) through the interchange station at Mushaireb and from there continuing westwards from Al Saad to Sport City. The line comprises 10 underground stations, a stabling yard, a centralised cooling plant facility, tunnel sections, tunnel ventilation shafts, plant rooms and equipment, cross passages, emergency exits, and all station and tunnel systems required for an operational underground railway.

For the core systems (and certain non-core systems) RAM and safety targets were defined and all equipment had to be compatible with the EM environment in which it operates.

The Design and Build (D&B) contractor (Aktor, Larsen & Toubro, Yapi Merkezi, STFA and Al Jaber Joint Venture (ALYSJ JV)) was in severe difficulty, seriously behind programme and unable to meet its contractual obligations in respect of delivering the RAMS and EMC works for its scope of supply to its client, Qatar Rail.

Because of this, Transsol was requested to undertake a detailed technical review the JV’s requirements and key deliverables relating to its contractual obligations, assess where the problems lay, and determine what works would be required to address these. Following this, an independent safety assessment of the main safety deliverables prepared by the JV was carried out to determine the status in respect to compliance with CENELEC standards and CSM and propose solutions to identified problems (the JV needed to have its ‘house in order’ before issuing documentation to the Employer’s (Qatar Rail) ISA).

Based on the above, Transsol undertook all the RAMS and EMC studies for the Doha Metro Gold Line for both the detailed design stage 2 (DD2) and latterly the testing and commissioning (T&C) phases of the project.

The following activities were part of the JV’s scope of works and for which the associated RAMS and EMC works were undertaken:

  • The construction of the underground metro system including civil and architectural works, tunnelling and station structures, systems and linewide systems’ interfaces
  • Tunnel ventilation shafts and plant rooms
  • First stage track-bed concrete in tunnels and stations
  • Ancillary utilities systems for tunnels including lighting, emergency lighting and power
  • Supply and installation of ductwork in tunnels
  • Emergency and maintenance walkways within tunnels and stations
  • Drainage, sumps, pipes and pumps
  • The Mechanical and Electrical Plant (MEP)


The scope of works included:

  • Independent review and safety assessment of JV documentation
  • Compliance with CENELEC standards EN50126, EN50128 and EN50129, IEC 61508 & CSM
  • Demonstration that the designs met the defined numeric reliability/availability and safety targets (through FTA and RBD analyses)
  • Demonstration that the designs met all defined maintainability targets and to determine the levels of maintenance required to achieve the operational reliability requirements



The key deliverables included:

  • RAM, Safety and EMC control plans
  • System breakdown structures
  • Functional analysis and fault schedules
  • FMECA, RBD and FTA analyses
  • Reliability and safety critical items' lists (RCIL and SCIL)
  • Equipment fault data reports
  • RAM demonstation and reporting
  • Life cycle costs (LCC) analysis
  • Maintainability task analysis (MTA)
  • Engineering safety validation plan
  • Verification and Validation (V&V) plan
  • System, sub-system, interface, operations & support and EMC hazard identification and analysis
  • Preparation and management of hazard logs
  • Safety Integrity Level (SIL) allocation and assessment in accordance with IEC 61508
  • Preliminary, final design and 'as built' safety cases



NEOM Project KSA



The NEOM Project is a USD 500bn project to deliver a new urban development area known as ‘The Line’ linking the coast in the Red Sea area in the north-western Tabuk Province of Saudi Arabia with the mountain and Upper Valley area where a new airport will be constructed.

The Line building is a continuous structure that will comprise the new urban development which will be 170km in length and comprised of two 500m high mirrored wall like structures some 200m wide. The Line building will be served by transport infrastructure provided by three railway systems:

  • A high-speed rail line running from the airport, through the mountain running tunnels (30km in length) and then in cut and cover tunnels to the coast
  • Α Group Mass Transit (GMT) driverless metro running in cut and cover tunnels from the cost to the mountains
  • A freight line from the airport, through the mountain running tunnels (30km in length) and then in cut and cover tunnels to the coast


Transsol provided engineering safety management for the project’s design consultant, Aecom, covering the entirety of Aecom’s design scope for the above rail systems.

The scope of works included for the following design work packages:

  • Mountain running tunnels (30 km in length) – civil works design
  • Cut and cover tunnels (120km in length) – civil works design
  • Rail systems
  • Stations (including MEP and station systems)
  • Depots (including MEP and depot systems)
  • Rail alignment
  • Rolling stock (HSR, fright and driverless metro)


The works required a comprehensive independent review of all the existing project RAM and safety documentation for compliance against project and international standards. The review resulted in a re-write of critical documentation to bring this into compliance with the applicable standards. In particular, the following key safety documentation was re-written:

  • System safety plan
  • Safety V&V plan
  • Engineering safety management plant



In addition to the above, the project hazard log was found to be non-compliant with CENELEC standards and CSM. Accordingly, a new EN50126:2017 compliant hazard log was developed and deployed on the project. A series of hazard identification workshops were planned and executed o identify all foreseeable hazards based on the current design stage for each design work package. The hazards identified were documented and inputted to the new CENELEC/CSM compliant hazard log where they are assessed pre and post mitigation according to EN50126:2017 criteria based on control measures identified to mitigate identified risks. All control measures were unambiguously defined, uniquely identified and allocated to the appropriate hazard owner.



Finch West Light Rail Transit (FWLRT) Project



The Finch West Light Rail Transit (FWLRT) system is a twin track guided rail tramway running east/west between Finch West and Humber College in Toronto, Canada. It comprises:

  • 11km of LRT run in a semi-exclusive guideway along Finch Avenue in northwest Toronto
  • Two below surface terminus stations (Finch West and Humber College)
  • 16 surface stops
  • A maintenance service facility (MSF) at Yorkgate Blvd
  • Rolling stock
  • Signalling and control equipment
  • Other systems and equipment to support operations



Transsol was engaged by Mosaic Transit Corporation (MTC) to undertake a number of fixed price, fixed scope, packages of work as follows:

  1. An assessment of the reliability of switches and crossings accounting for common cause failure events
  2. Reliability assessment of the low voltage power distribution supporting critical signalling assets
  3. General LV/MV distribution RAM assessment
  4. FWLRT station stops’ UPS design RAM assessment
  5. RAM Demonstration plan
  6. Derivation/calculation of rail vehicle fleet reliability/availability requirements



Package 1 was concerned with establishing the need (or otherwise) for condition monitoring of switches and crossings installed on the FW LRT system in order to ensure that the overall trackwork availability target could be achieved. The original designer’s RAM assessment had not properly accounted for the potential for common mode failure of S&Cs.

Transsol was tasked with preparing a RAM Assessment that accounted for the common cause failures (mainly ice and third body blockages) which concluded that condition monitoring of critical switches was required in order to support the overall trackwork availability requirement.

Package 2 was to assess the reliability/availability of the low voltage (LV) power supply arrangements for the signalling and train control (S&TC) equipment installed at MSF Yard and Finch West and Humber College stations in order to:

  • Determine the optimum design in terms of resilience to potential single point failures
  • Provide a recommendation for the optimum design solution



Package 3 was to:

  • Assess the power supply provision required to support the fed equipment reliability requirements
  • Determine a RAM target for the LV distribution provision required to enable the FWLRT system to operate without penalty
  • Prepare Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of the proposed LV design
  • Based on the results of the FMECA for the LV distribution undertake RAM assessment in accordance with the requirements of the MTC RAM Plan



Package 4 was to assess the reliability/availability of the modular N+1 UPS provision to:

  • Determine the expected availability of the N+1 UPS required to support the essential loads
  • Provide a recommendation for the UPS provision for the surface stop stations



Package 5 was to develop the processes and methodologies for the RAM demonstration programme to be implemented during the trial running period.

Package 6 was to derive the rail vehicle fleet availability requirements and minimum fleet size required to support operations on the FWLRT without penalty (i.e. so as to avoid lost mileage penalties). This required the development of the assessment/calculation methodology and how to articulate the results in a clear and coherent manner to the MTC management.

Each of the above was undertaken on a firm fixed price basis with deliverables being technical reports subject to review and acceptance by MTC and, in some cases, Metrolinx.



West Coast Main Line Power Supply Upgrade Project.



Turnkey contractor for undertaking EMC studies for the auto-transformer (AT) trial sites and AT feeder stations. Data obtained for:



  • Performance of the AT equipment
  • Verification of the design through simulation of the AT system performance and evaluation of ABB and AREVA transformers
  • Analysis of the results to demonstrate compatibility of the AT system design/performance with existing signalling infrastructure

Preparation of EMC safety case based in the results of data collation exercise.


Introduction of ElectroLogIX Interlocking to UK Signalling Infrastructure



Production of design engineering safety justification (DESJ) for the first commissioning of the new ElectroLogIXS based SIL 4 signalling system in the UK (Crossrail Old Oak Common Depot and Shepperton Branch Resignalling) including:

  • Validation of the ladder logic software against the requirements of EN50128 for SIL 4
  • Preparation and management of the project hazard log
  • Dealing with ISA comments through to final acceptance of the safety cases and bringing into service of the equipment



Qatar Lusail City Tramway Project



Depot RAMS Assessments



RAMS assessment of the tramway depot main systems and equipment and interface with the operational routeway together with depot operations.



Tunnel Ventilation System Safety Case



Detailed fault analysis of the TVS and preparation of the system safety case to support the design and installation to the requirements of SIL 2 according to IEC 61508.



Crossrail Comms and Control (Contract C660)



Safety assurance for comms and SCADA systems

  • Safety assurance for linewide and stations' SCADA systems including interfaces with signalling, traction power, tunnel ventilation, OLE, track & stations and shafts & portals' MEP systems
  • Preparation of safety justifications for progressive introduction of the SCADA system into service


Riyadh Metro Project

Engineering safety management with responsibility for all RAMS and EMC activities and deliverables for the iconic KAFD station. Included RAMS and EMC planning and management of the main safety and EMC hazard logs. Scope of works covered all aspects of the station design including civil and structural works, architectural elements and station MEP as well as interfaces with other design work packages (e.g. viaduct, trackwork and rolling stock).



RaCom is part of Transsol’s unique RAMS technologies being a web based database tool that integrates Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) and Reliability Demonstration Testing (RDT) functionality. Both the RCM and RDT modules offer unparalleled technical solutions to performing and reporting RCM and RDT programmes. The software comprises individual modules that share the same data structure providing a fully integrated platform for these activities.

The overall package includes the tools, processes, guidelines, training and support to undertake and report RCM and RDT tasks. These can be provided as a complete package to be used by a client organisation or as part of wider consultancy whereby a client’s RCM and RDT programmes can be executed/managed and reported by Transsol.



The owners or operators of:



  • Any system, the key assets of which are essential for safety and/or operations
  • Assets that have a maintenance or whole life cost burden that may be reduced through knowledge of the effectiveness of existing maintenance regimes and their impact upon the service life and reliability of those assets
  • Assets where in-service reliability performance and/or reliability growth are important metrics



The information that is obtained through the RCM exercise is used to drive the maintenance tasks and associated scheduling such that maintenance tasks can be optimised and whole life costs of assets minimised. Furthermore, this information must be maintained to act as the evidence supporting the decisions made and made available for audit and future review purposes.

The tools developed by Transsol for implementing RCM programmes are ideally suited to the long-term maintenance, review and audit of the information.

To precis the situation in respect of maintenance scheduling:



  • The past (based on established practices and attitudes):
    • Inspection and maintenance (I&M) tasks ‘are what they are’, ‘are what they have always been, or ‘are what suppliers have recommended’
    • Has a significant cost and ties up valuable resources
    • May affect operations (maintenance over-runs)
    • Present risks to maintainers in performing their duties
    • Maintenance induced errors can affect service reliability and/or safety

  • The future (based on RCM)
    • Establish safe minimum levels of maintenance
    • Significantly reduce maintenance induced failures
    • Provide justification/evidence for optimising I&M intervals

To perform an RCM programme requires some investment to obtain information about assets and asset performance that can be used to:



  • Work out what maintenance is necessary and what is not
  • Determine optimised maintenance intervals/scheduling for required tasks
  • Quantify whole life costs of ownership

So that the organisation can:


  • Reduce the maintenance burden and save on whole life costs
  • Reduce maintenance induced errors to improve levels of safety and operational reliability

In summary RCM creates cost effective maintenance strategies that challenged established maintenance practices which:


  • Significantly increased levels of safety and reliability through systematic approach to defining maintenance programmes

This leads to:


  • An engineering framework for defining complete maintenance regimen that regarded maintenance as the means to maintain critical functions

In turn this leads to:


  • Much reduced maintenance burdens whilst significantly increasing levels of safety and reliability

The RCM process is defined in the standard SAE JA 1012 and whilst it is fundamentally straightforward it almost always proves to be very complicated when put into practice. This is due to the nature of the systems and equipment being assessed and the volume of information that is gathered and needs to be recorded. It is therefore essential that:



  • The process is clearly defined and followed
  • The decision points are clearly identified and applied consistently and appropriately
  • The RCM process is managed effectively and the right systems are used to record the assessment at every stage
  • The effectiveness of maintenance is kept under constant review and adjusted according to experience gained


RCM can deliver significant operational improvements and whole life cost (WLC) savings through:

  • Establishing what maintenance tasks are necessary and what are not
  • Calculating the optimised maintenance scheduling and associated resourcing which provides for:
    • Reduced maintenance burden/costs resulting in reduced WLC
    • Improved operating performance/longer useful life
    • Greater safety and environmental integrity
  • Providing a fully documented record of maintenance requirements (evidence for decisions)
  • Keeping it as simple as possible and engaging key personnel who add real value to the exercise

The RCM process is predicated on obtaining answers to seven basic questions:


  1. What are the functions and associated performance of an asset?
  2. In what way does it fail to fulfil its functions?
  3. What causes the functional failures?
  4. What happens when each functional failure occurs?
  5. In what way does each functional failure matter?
  6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure?
  7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found?

To answer each of the above a 6-step RCM lifecycle has been defined with records maintained at each step in a bespoke relational database that organises the information for easy access and navigation. This 6-step lifecycle is:


  1. Define the system breakdown structure
  2. Identify functions, functional failures and failure modes
  3. Undertake consequence evaluation
  4. Undertake maintenance task evaluation
  5. Identify specific maintenance tasks
  6. Optimise resourcing and maintenance task scheduling

The above process is summarised in the following figures.


Applying the RCM process is geared towards answering the 7 basic questions. For most applications there is seldom sufficient historical records to provide the answers, therefore review groups are set up to gather and assess the required information.


A typical RCM review group comprises plant operators, maintenance personnel, supervisors and specialists (as necessary) all managed through a facilitator as shown in the figure below.



Under the guidance of the facilitator, the group analyses the context in which each asset operates and completes the RCM assessment worksheets (see Part 3). The RCM decision diagram is then used to decide how to deal with the identified failure modes. The whole process is managed using the RCM management tool (RaCom) which is the relational RCM database used to store, manage, assess and record the findings for all of the information pertinent to the RCM programme.

The overall management and information flow from an RCM assessment group is summarised in the figure below.


The key objectives of the 6-step RCM process are to identify potential modes of failure of equipment and assess each to:

  • Classify the identified failures into one of the following categories:
    • Unrevealed (hidden) failures
    • Failures affecting safety
    • Failures affecting environment
    • Failures affecting operations
  • Determine if it is physically possible to perform a proactive task that reduces, or enables action to be taken to reduce, the consequences of the failure. If this can be done then the task is ‘technically feasible’
  • Assess whether the task actually reduces the failure consequences to an extent that justifies the direct and indirect costs of doing the task. If the answer is yes then the task is ‘worth doing’
  • If no proactive task can be identified then the nature of the failure consequences will dictate a ‘default action’ to be taken

RaCom is a relational database engineered specifically to manage the RCM process. It allows for the RCM process to be properly and consistently applied and provides for the efficient management and access to the key information. To this end it implements the 6-step RCM process and is designed to be intuitive and easy to use.

There are four main elements to the RaCon RCM management module:

  • Logical system definition and set up (the SBS)
  • Allocation of functions, functional failures and failure modes and appropriation of all necessary reference data
  • Assessment area compliant with SAE JA1012
  • Record of all workshops, attendees and attendee participation


The main features of RaCom are as follows:

  • Rigorous and consistent implementation of RCM in accordance with SAE JA1012 to:
    • Determine all necessary maintenance tasks
    • Provides full audit trail/evidence for all RCM decisions
    • Provide inputs to maintenance scheduling/resourcing tools (e.g. MMS)
  • Easy navigation through related records
    • Facilitates rapid assimilation and recording of information
    • Allows focus to be retained on the detail – no getting lost in spreadsheets
  • Automatic generation of reports

The RaCom datebase RCM module can be installed on a client's IT infrastructure or accessed remotely through a secure web-portal without the need for any third party software to be installed on client IT systems.

A full set of documentation is provided including guidelines and training for the application of the RCM process and use of the RaCom RCM module.



Modern day systems and equipment are expected to be very reliable and are often required to meet defined numeric reliability targets. These may be expressed as:

  • Percentage availability or reliability
  • Mean time, mean distance or mean operations between failure
  • Dimensionless probabilities of failure on demand

The quantities listed above are important to owners of assets and/or manufacturers/suppliers of equipment, where the reliability of such equipment is either a key performance indicator or a key measure of safety. They are also critical quantities required to optimise scheduled inspection and maintenance activities as part of an RCM programme which can provide the formal justification and primary evidence to optimise inspection and testing regimes thereby reducing the whole life costs of assets.

There are established techniques to perform theoretical analyses of systems and equipment in order to provide a theoretical prediction of reliability performance. The ability to prove that predicted reliability metrics are achieved by in-service operation (i.e. to measure the achieved in-service reliability performance) is more problematic.

The common pitfalls include:



No proper forethought about how the FRACAS will be used or for what

No clear guidelines or documented process

Lack of adequate (or any) analytical capabilities

These problems can be summarised as follows:



  • Free text entry undermines the effectiveness and value of a FRACAS
  • No control over what is entered
  • Often vague statements of varying quality
  • Same events described in different ways (and most often imprecisely)
  • People write what they think has happened (which often is not what actually happened)
  • Meaningful post event analysis is rarely possible (very limited post event analysis)

Put simply, an ill conceived FRACAS will deliver the following!

The RaCom RDT module addresses these problems by being:

Well thought through - intuitive and informative

Worthwhile & seen to be worth doing - coherent, easily understood and easy to use

Coherent, rigorous and consistent - no room for subjective judgments

Based on predefined & verified base data

Accurate


A well constructed RDT programme can deliver significant added value:



Unlike any other FRACAS, the RaCom RDT module removes the need for subjective judgments (free text entry) for any data critical to the assessment and it goes well beyond any other FRACAS in that it provides automatic evaluation and reporting of system level in-service reliability performance and demonstration of reliability growth.

All the information that needs to be recorded is predefined thereby removing the need for personnel to make subjective judgments and also removing the possibility for ambiguous, misleading or incorrect data being collated. This ensures that the in-service reliability performance of monitored systems and equipment is accurately and consistently recorded in a coherent and verifiable manner enabling the results to be evaluated against contractual targets/safety requirements.

RaCom is a multi-user system which can be used to evaluate overall system reliability performance for a wide range of assets. It can be deployed on an asset owner’s own IT system or it can be accessed over the internet via a secure web connection negating the need to install any software, or maintain any data, on a client’s IT infrastructure.

Where system Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) requirements have been defined then these targets require a period of RDT to be performed in order to prove that the installed systems perform as predicted and as required. An RDT programme may also be implemented to support RCM to reduce inspection and maintenance regimes thereby reducing whole life costs of essential assets.

The RDT is undertaken with the RaCom RDT module and is implemented in two main parts:

  1. System/equipment set-up details, RDT test parameters and FMECA
  2. Fault, corrective action and maintenance task recording, analysis and reporting


At its most fundamental level the RDT can be summarised as the process for recording failure incidents, analysing the effects of failures on system RAM performance and calculating the system level reliability performance. In this way it provides information that can inform asset owners, operators and maintainers to optimise their operations and maintenance procedures; this is summarised as follows:

  • Record
    • Equipment failures
    • Corrective actions
    • Maintenance tasks
    • Dates and times
  • Analyse
    • Effects and consequences of failures/maintenance on system RAM performance
  • Calculate
    • System reliability, availability and MTBF/MDBF/MOBF
  • Provide
    • Data and reports of system RAMS performance
    • Identify trends
    • Demonstrate reliability growth
  • Inform
    • Asset owners, operators and maintainers



The main elements of the overall RDT are:

  • RDT documentation, code catalogues and guidelines
  • Data collation
  • RaCom database RDT module


Documentation

The key documentation comprises:



  • RDT Systems Assurance Plan
  • RDT Test Plans (one per system)
  • Code Catalogues
  • RDT Guidelines
  • Training

The documentation is the key to the quality and consistency of the exercise providing verified input data thus removing the need for free text entry as part of the process.

The RDT SAP defines the scope of the testing, identifies the systems and equipment included in the RDT, defines the metrics to be measured and the acceptance criteria and enables the fundamentals to be agreed by the stakeholders. It also defines the roles and responsibilities of all personnel involved in the process.

The RDT test plan documents are the key technical elements. There is one RDT test plan per system and each presents all of the system specific information (i.e. all of the information required for the RDT programme) and allows for review and approval of this prior to commencement of the testing itself. This is the key to the consistency and quality of the data.

Specifically, the RDT test plan reports define the following:

  • All technical details for the each system
    • System equipment name, type and code
    • Equipment failure modes, effects and 'relevance'
  • System failure or unavailability
  • Equipment maintenance tasks, periodicity and durations (from RCM module if available)
  • Numeric reliability targets/requirements
  • Relevant test time
  • Operation and maintenance procedures that may impact the RDT


All the above information is uniquely coded and constitutes the code catalogues which comprises of:

  • All systems and component equipment
  • System level failure modes
  • All component level failure modes (and their relevance or otherwise to the system failures)
  • All locations (combination of an equipment and a location being a unique installation)


The above forms the base data that is imported into the RaCom database prior to commencement of the RDT programme. The code catalogues (used during the testing itself) are produced by the RaCom database itself once it has been uploaded with the verified base data although this same information is accessible through the relevant database user interface screens.

The guidelines provide a comprehensive set of instructions and guidance - they explain the process, how to implement it and how to use the RaCom database RDT module. The guidelines are also embedded in the 'help' function which is part of the RDT module.



Data Collation

All of the information collated as part of the RDT is recorded on specific forms. There are three different forms used for recording:

  • Faults (the form RDT-01)
  • Corrective actions (the form RDT-02)
  • Maintenance activities (the form RDT-03)


Each form is designed to be as simple as possible whilst still allowing all of the necessary information to be recorded. The main feature of the RDT is that all of the information recorded on the forms has been assessed and precisely defined prior to commencement of the testing. In turn this information has been uniquely coded and the codes listed in a code catalogue. Thus, there is no requirement for subjective judgements to be made by personnel involved in the fault recording activities.

This is the key to the consistency and quality of the recorded data and enables a meaningful measure of a system’s in-service reliability/availability to be obtained.

All of the pre-defined coded information will already be uploaded into the RaCom database RDT module. The data collation exercise can be undertaken using electronic forms for which, the information that is required to be inputted is accessible from the data in the database. Alternatively, a paper based equivalent can be used where the information required is obtained from the code catalogues that can be printed separately.

One fault report form will be raised for each incident fault (the form RDT-01) and from this a related corrective action report can be automatically generated from the database (the form RDT-03). All maintenance tasks are similarly recorded on the form RDT-03 and used when interrogating the database for any maintenance activities that may have taken equipment out of service coincident with reported faults.

Database

The RDT module is a relational database that establishes links between:

  • Systems and;
    • equipment and locations (installations) and;
      • failure modes, effects and consequences


Based on the above, together with the accurate recording of incident failure events the RDT module generates:

  • Fault reports
  • Related corrective action reports
  • Maintenance task reports


From this it automatically calculates:

  • Equipment and system downtimes
  • Relevance of failures to system level RAM performance
  • System reliability/availability performance and MTBF/MDBF/MOBF


The above can be summarised as shown in the figure below.



The RDT programme is managed through the RaCom RDT database. This is a full relational database providing:

  • Full audit trail of recorded failure events and corrective actions
  • Real time measure of achieved system level RAM performance
  • Automatic generation of fault, corrective action and maintenance reports
  • Automatic calculation of RAM metrics based on incident failure data
  • Dashboards showing:
    • System level RAM performance
    • Customisable reliability growth charts over user defined time-frames

The RaCom RDT module provides a clean and coherent user interface for:

  • Managing RDT test set-up
    • System breakdown structure
    • FMECA
    • RAM targets
  • Managing incident fault reporting and associated corrective actions
  • Preparing reports using customisable dashboards
  • Interrogation of historic data for audit and analysis



The RaCom RDT module is the ultimate RAM demonstration tool. The key features can be summarised as follows:

  • All critical information is pre-defined and verified
  • No free text entry for any critical information
  • Local or web hosted solutions
  • Incident fault data entry using hand-held devices
  • Three levels of data validation (see Guidelines)
  • Permissions base database allows for guest user read only access
  • Provides accurate and verifiable RAM demonstration


We provide the knowledge and technical experience to deliver RCM & RDT programmes to clients worldwide using our RaCom software.

This 'know how' can be deployed to deliver RCM & RDT programmes to clients. We also empower clients to achieve the benefits of structured RCM & RDT programmes using their own 'in-house' resources through training, support and licensing of our processes and tools.

Our experts connect the dots between assets, people, systems and data with the objective of creating an in-house expertise equipped to provide an organic growth in RCM & RDT capabilities.

We have over 30 years subject matter experience working with asset intensive organisations in the rail and power generation sectors. We are committed to implementing strategies to fully deploy RCM & RDT solutions that deliver tangible benefits to your organisation in the manner most suited to it.

We offer a 3-phase implementation strategy as follows:

  • Initial appraisal
    • Tasks
      • Review of existing maintenance regimes and/or system reliability performance to determine potential benefits from implementing an RCM and/or RDT programme
    • Output
      • Defines the scope of any proposed assessments
      • Provides realistic timescales and costs
      • Provide key deliverables and performance indicators
    • Benefit
      • Agreed scope and costs
      • No risk. No obligation to proceed or rollout further


  • Initial deployment
    • Tasks
      • Deploy RaCom RCM and/or RDT modules on an agreed scope (no matter how large or how small)
      • Work with client to identify any 'quick wins' and structure the assessment accordingly to deliver tangible benefits in minimum time frames
      • Proves the viability of the methodology, process and tools and is a vital element in gaining and maintaining stakeholder engagement
    • Output
      • Results of assessment on agreed scope
    • Benefit
      • Optimised maintenance and costs of ownership for assessed scope
      • Measure of in-service reliability performance for assessed scope
      • Benefits of rolling out further can be seen and an informed decision made


  • Scale up and rollout
    • Tasks
      • Scale up or rollout to any desired level
      • Transsol will drive the wider scope whether it is for more assets, a wider asset grouping or plant wide
      • With our knowledge, experience and 'know how' we take an organisation's people, processes and systems into account. We can provide management and training and deliver the tools and technical know-how to an organisation so that it can acquire the in-house capabilities for the longer term
    • Output
      • As for the initial assessment but for a larger scope
      • The greater the scope the greater the potential for cost savings over asset lifetimes
    • Benefit
      • Rollout can be staged according to client requirements
      • No obligations beyond agreed scope and time-frames
      • Opportunities for in-house development and training


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